An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker who controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.

A vulnerability in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker who can control both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, bypassing Jinja's sandbox protections. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have the ability to manipulate both the template's filename and its contents. The risk depends on the application's specific use case. This issue affects applications that render untrusted templates where the attacker can determine the template filename, potentially leading to severe security breaches.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Affected versions of Django-allauth are vulnerable to CSRF and replay attacks in the SAML login flow. RelayStatewas used to keep track of whether or not the login flow was IdP or SP initiated. As RelayState is a separate field, not part of the SAMLResponse payload, it was not signed, causing the vulnerability.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Insufficient Session Expiration due to access and refresh tokens remaining valid after the associated user account is deactivated. In django-allauth’s IdP OpenID Connect implementation, allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/request_validator.py does not check instance.user.is_active in validate_bearer_token() and validate_refresh_token(), and allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/device_codes.py previously returned token state without revalidating the user’s active status.

In Django-allauth, a vulnerability allows attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the login page when configuring the Facebook provider to use the `js_sdk` method, potentially compromising user sessions or stealing sensitive information.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to improper validation of the SAML RelayState parameter when IdP-initiated SSO is enabled. In the SAML login flow, django-allauth accepts any URL supplied in RelayState and uses it as the post-authentication redirect target, allowing untrusted external destinations to be processed without restriction when IdP-initiated SSO is turned on, which is disabled by default.

Affected versions of allauth are vulnerable to account enumeration through timing attacks (CWE-203). This vulnerability allows attackers to determine the existence of user accounts by measuring response times during email/password authentication attempts. The issue resides in the AuthenticationBackend._authenticate_by_email method, which did not mitigate timing discrepancies. Exploitation can be performed remotely with high feasibility. Users should update to the latest version of allauth to apply the implemented timing attack mitigations.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Authorization Bypass due to the use of a mutable identifier (preferred_username) from third-party providers for authorization decisions. The authentication logic in django-allauth’s social account handling uses the preferred_username field from Okta and NetIQ OpenID Connect identity providers as the canonical user identifier, which may be changed by an attacker and is not stable enough to base authorization on; the code fails to validate that the identifier is immutable.

An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker who controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.

A vulnerability in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker who can control both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, bypassing Jinja's sandbox protections. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have the ability to manipulate both the template's filename and its contents. The risk depends on the application's specific use case. This issue affects applications that render untrusted templates where the attacker can determine the template filename, potentially leading to severe security breaches.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Affected versions of Django-allauth are vulnerable to CSRF and replay attacks in the SAML login flow. RelayStatewas used to keep track of whether or not the login flow was IdP or SP initiated. As RelayState is a separate field, not part of the SAMLResponse payload, it was not signed, causing the vulnerability.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Insufficient Session Expiration due to access and refresh tokens remaining valid after the associated user account is deactivated. In django-allauth’s IdP OpenID Connect implementation, allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/request_validator.py does not check instance.user.is_active in validate_bearer_token() and validate_refresh_token(), and allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/device_codes.py previously returned token state without revalidating the user’s active status.

In Django-allauth, a vulnerability allows attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the login page when configuring the Facebook provider to use the `js_sdk` method, potentially compromising user sessions or stealing sensitive information.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to improper validation of the SAML RelayState parameter when IdP-initiated SSO is enabled. In the SAML login flow, django-allauth accepts any URL supplied in RelayState and uses it as the post-authentication redirect target, allowing untrusted external destinations to be processed without restriction when IdP-initiated SSO is turned on, which is disabled by default.

Affected versions of allauth are vulnerable to account enumeration through timing attacks (CWE-203). This vulnerability allows attackers to determine the existence of user accounts by measuring response times during email/password authentication attempts. The issue resides in the AuthenticationBackend._authenticate_by_email method, which did not mitigate timing discrepancies. Exploitation can be performed remotely with high feasibility. Users should update to the latest version of allauth to apply the implemented timing attack mitigations.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Authorization Bypass due to the use of a mutable identifier (preferred_username) from third-party providers for authorization decisions. The authentication logic in django-allauth’s social account handling uses the preferred_username field from Okta and NetIQ OpenID Connect identity providers as the canonical user identifier, which may be changed by an attacker and is not stable enough to base authorization on; the code fails to validate that the identifier is immutable.

An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker who controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.

A vulnerability in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker who can control both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, bypassing Jinja's sandbox protections. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have the ability to manipulate both the template's filename and its contents. The risk depends on the application's specific use case. This issue affects applications that render untrusted templates where the attacker can determine the template filename, potentially leading to severe security breaches.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Affected versions of Django-allauth are vulnerable to CSRF and replay attacks in the SAML login flow. RelayStatewas used to keep track of whether or not the login flow was IdP or SP initiated. As RelayState is a separate field, not part of the SAMLResponse payload, it was not signed, causing the vulnerability.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Insufficient Session Expiration due to access and refresh tokens remaining valid after the associated user account is deactivated. In django-allauth’s IdP OpenID Connect implementation, allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/request_validator.py does not check instance.user.is_active in validate_bearer_token() and validate_refresh_token(), and allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/device_codes.py previously returned token state without revalidating the user’s active status.

In Django-allauth, a vulnerability allows attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the login page when configuring the Facebook provider to use the `js_sdk` method, potentially compromising user sessions or stealing sensitive information.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to improper validation of the SAML RelayState parameter when IdP-initiated SSO is enabled. In the SAML login flow, django-allauth accepts any URL supplied in RelayState and uses it as the post-authentication redirect target, allowing untrusted external destinations to be processed without restriction when IdP-initiated SSO is turned on, which is disabled by default.

Affected versions of allauth are vulnerable to account enumeration through timing attacks (CWE-203). This vulnerability allows attackers to determine the existence of user accounts by measuring response times during email/password authentication attempts. The issue resides in the AuthenticationBackend._authenticate_by_email method, which did not mitigate timing discrepancies. Exploitation can be performed remotely with high feasibility. Users should update to the latest version of allauth to apply the implemented timing attack mitigations.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Authorization Bypass due to the use of a mutable identifier (preferred_username) from third-party providers for authorization decisions. The authentication logic in django-allauth’s social account handling uses the preferred_username field from Okta and NetIQ OpenID Connect identity providers as the canonical user identifier, which may be changed by an attacker and is not stable enough to base authorization on; the code fails to validate that the identifier is immutable.

An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker who controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.

A vulnerability in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker who can control both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, bypassing Jinja's sandbox protections. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have the ability to manipulate both the template's filename and its contents. The risk depends on the application's specific use case. This issue affects applications that render untrusted templates where the attacker can determine the template filename, potentially leading to severe security breaches.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Affected versions of Django-allauth are vulnerable to CSRF and replay attacks in the SAML login flow. RelayStatewas used to keep track of whether or not the login flow was IdP or SP initiated. As RelayState is a separate field, not part of the SAMLResponse payload, it was not signed, causing the vulnerability.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Insufficient Session Expiration due to access and refresh tokens remaining valid after the associated user account is deactivated. In django-allauth’s IdP OpenID Connect implementation, allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/request_validator.py does not check instance.user.is_active in validate_bearer_token() and validate_refresh_token(), and allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/device_codes.py previously returned token state without revalidating the user’s active status.

In Django-allauth, a vulnerability allows attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the login page when configuring the Facebook provider to use the `js_sdk` method, potentially compromising user sessions or stealing sensitive information.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to improper validation of the SAML RelayState parameter when IdP-initiated SSO is enabled. In the SAML login flow, django-allauth accepts any URL supplied in RelayState and uses it as the post-authentication redirect target, allowing untrusted external destinations to be processed without restriction when IdP-initiated SSO is turned on, which is disabled by default.

Affected versions of allauth are vulnerable to account enumeration through timing attacks (CWE-203). This vulnerability allows attackers to determine the existence of user accounts by measuring response times during email/password authentication attempts. The issue resides in the AuthenticationBackend._authenticate_by_email method, which did not mitigate timing discrepancies. Exploitation can be performed remotely with high feasibility. Users should update to the latest version of allauth to apply the implemented timing attack mitigations.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Authorization Bypass due to the use of a mutable identifier (preferred_username) from third-party providers for authorization decisions. The authentication logic in django-allauth’s social account handling uses the preferred_username field from Okta and NetIQ OpenID Connect identity providers as the canonical user identifier, which may be changed by an attacker and is not stable enough to base authorization on; the code fails to validate that the identifier is immutable.

An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker who controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.

A vulnerability in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker who can control both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, bypassing Jinja's sandbox protections. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have the ability to manipulate both the template's filename and its contents. The risk depends on the application's specific use case. This issue affects applications that render untrusted templates where the attacker can determine the template filename, potentially leading to severe security breaches.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Affected versions of Django-allauth are vulnerable to CSRF and replay attacks in the SAML login flow. RelayStatewas used to keep track of whether or not the login flow was IdP or SP initiated. As RelayState is a separate field, not part of the SAMLResponse payload, it was not signed, causing the vulnerability.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Insufficient Session Expiration due to access and refresh tokens remaining valid after the associated user account is deactivated. In django-allauth’s IdP OpenID Connect implementation, allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/request_validator.py does not check instance.user.is_active in validate_bearer_token() and validate_refresh_token(), and allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/device_codes.py previously returned token state without revalidating the user’s active status.

In Django-allauth, a vulnerability allows attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the login page when configuring the Facebook provider to use the `js_sdk` method, potentially compromising user sessions or stealing sensitive information.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to improper validation of the SAML RelayState parameter when IdP-initiated SSO is enabled. In the SAML login flow, django-allauth accepts any URL supplied in RelayState and uses it as the post-authentication redirect target, allowing untrusted external destinations to be processed without restriction when IdP-initiated SSO is turned on, which is disabled by default.

Affected versions of allauth are vulnerable to account enumeration through timing attacks (CWE-203). This vulnerability allows attackers to determine the existence of user accounts by measuring response times during email/password authentication attempts. The issue resides in the AuthenticationBackend._authenticate_by_email method, which did not mitigate timing discrepancies. Exploitation can be performed remotely with high feasibility. Users should update to the latest version of allauth to apply the implemented timing attack mitigations.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Authorization Bypass due to the use of a mutable identifier (preferred_username) from third-party providers for authorization decisions. The authentication logic in django-allauth’s social account handling uses the preferred_username field from Okta and NetIQ OpenID Connect identity providers as the canonical user identifier, which may be changed by an attacker and is not stable enough to base authorization on; the code fails to validate that the identifier is immutable.

An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker who controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.

A vulnerability in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker who can control both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, bypassing Jinja's sandbox protections. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have the ability to manipulate both the template's filename and its contents. The risk depends on the application's specific use case. This issue affects applications that render untrusted templates where the attacker can determine the template filename, potentially leading to severe security breaches.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Affected versions of Django-allauth are vulnerable to CSRF and replay attacks in the SAML login flow. RelayStatewas used to keep track of whether or not the login flow was IdP or SP initiated. As RelayState is a separate field, not part of the SAMLResponse payload, it was not signed, causing the vulnerability.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Insufficient Session Expiration due to access and refresh tokens remaining valid after the associated user account is deactivated. In django-allauth’s IdP OpenID Connect implementation, allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/request_validator.py does not check instance.user.is_active in validate_bearer_token() and validate_refresh_token(), and allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/device_codes.py previously returned token state without revalidating the user’s active status.

In Django-allauth, a vulnerability allows attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the login page when configuring the Facebook provider to use the `js_sdk` method, potentially compromising user sessions or stealing sensitive information.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to improper validation of the SAML RelayState parameter when IdP-initiated SSO is enabled. In the SAML login flow, django-allauth accepts any URL supplied in RelayState and uses it as the post-authentication redirect target, allowing untrusted external destinations to be processed without restriction when IdP-initiated SSO is turned on, which is disabled by default.

Affected versions of allauth are vulnerable to account enumeration through timing attacks (CWE-203). This vulnerability allows attackers to determine the existence of user accounts by measuring response times during email/password authentication attempts. The issue resides in the AuthenticationBackend._authenticate_by_email method, which did not mitigate timing discrepancies. Exploitation can be performed remotely with high feasibility. Users should update to the latest version of allauth to apply the implemented timing attack mitigations.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Authorization Bypass due to the use of a mutable identifier (preferred_username) from third-party providers for authorization decisions. The authentication logic in django-allauth’s social account handling uses the preferred_username field from Okta and NetIQ OpenID Connect identity providers as the canonical user identifier, which may be changed by an attacker and is not stable enough to base authorization on; the code fails to validate that the identifier is immutable.

An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker who controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.

A vulnerability in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker who can control both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, bypassing Jinja's sandbox protections. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have the ability to manipulate both the template's filename and its contents. The risk depends on the application's specific use case. This issue affects applications that render untrusted templates where the attacker can determine the template filename, potentially leading to severe security breaches.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Affected versions of Django-allauth are vulnerable to CSRF and replay attacks in the SAML login flow. RelayStatewas used to keep track of whether or not the login flow was IdP or SP initiated. As RelayState is a separate field, not part of the SAMLResponse payload, it was not signed, causing the vulnerability.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Insufficient Session Expiration due to access and refresh tokens remaining valid after the associated user account is deactivated. In django-allauth’s IdP OpenID Connect implementation, allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/request_validator.py does not check instance.user.is_active in validate_bearer_token() and validate_refresh_token(), and allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/device_codes.py previously returned token state without revalidating the user’s active status.

In Django-allauth, a vulnerability allows attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the login page when configuring the Facebook provider to use the `js_sdk` method, potentially compromising user sessions or stealing sensitive information.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to improper validation of the SAML RelayState parameter when IdP-initiated SSO is enabled. In the SAML login flow, django-allauth accepts any URL supplied in RelayState and uses it as the post-authentication redirect target, allowing untrusted external destinations to be processed without restriction when IdP-initiated SSO is turned on, which is disabled by default.

Affected versions of allauth are vulnerable to account enumeration through timing attacks (CWE-203). This vulnerability allows attackers to determine the existence of user accounts by measuring response times during email/password authentication attempts. The issue resides in the AuthenticationBackend._authenticate_by_email method, which did not mitigate timing discrepancies. Exploitation can be performed remotely with high feasibility. Users should update to the latest version of allauth to apply the implemented timing attack mitigations.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Authorization Bypass due to the use of a mutable identifier (preferred_username) from third-party providers for authorization decisions. The authentication logic in django-allauth’s social account handling uses the preferred_username field from Okta and NetIQ OpenID Connect identity providers as the canonical user identifier, which may be changed by an attacker and is not stable enough to base authorization on; the code fails to validate that the identifier is immutable.

An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker who controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.

A vulnerability in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker who can control both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, bypassing Jinja's sandbox protections. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have the ability to manipulate both the template's filename and its contents. The risk depends on the application's specific use case. This issue affects applications that render untrusted templates where the attacker can determine the template filename, potentially leading to severe security breaches.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Affected versions of Django-allauth are vulnerable to CSRF and replay attacks in the SAML login flow. RelayStatewas used to keep track of whether or not the login flow was IdP or SP initiated. As RelayState is a separate field, not part of the SAMLResponse payload, it was not signed, causing the vulnerability.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Insufficient Session Expiration due to access and refresh tokens remaining valid after the associated user account is deactivated. In django-allauth’s IdP OpenID Connect implementation, allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/request_validator.py does not check instance.user.is_active in validate_bearer_token() and validate_refresh_token(), and allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/device_codes.py previously returned token state without revalidating the user’s active status.

In Django-allauth, a vulnerability allows attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the login page when configuring the Facebook provider to use the `js_sdk` method, potentially compromising user sessions or stealing sensitive information.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to improper validation of the SAML RelayState parameter when IdP-initiated SSO is enabled. In the SAML login flow, django-allauth accepts any URL supplied in RelayState and uses it as the post-authentication redirect target, allowing untrusted external destinations to be processed without restriction when IdP-initiated SSO is turned on, which is disabled by default.

Affected versions of allauth are vulnerable to account enumeration through timing attacks (CWE-203). This vulnerability allows attackers to determine the existence of user accounts by measuring response times during email/password authentication attempts. The issue resides in the AuthenticationBackend._authenticate_by_email method, which did not mitigate timing discrepancies. Exploitation can be performed remotely with high feasibility. Users should update to the latest version of allauth to apply the implemented timing attack mitigations.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Authorization Bypass due to the use of a mutable identifier (preferred_username) from third-party providers for authorization decisions. The authentication logic in django-allauth’s social account handling uses the preferred_username field from Okta and NetIQ OpenID Connect identity providers as the canonical user identifier, which may be changed by an attacker and is not stable enough to base authorization on; the code fails to validate that the identifier is immutable.

An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker who controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.

A vulnerability in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker who can control both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, bypassing Jinja's sandbox protections. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have the ability to manipulate both the template's filename and its contents. The risk depends on the application's specific use case. This issue affects applications that render untrusted templates where the attacker can determine the template filename, potentially leading to severe security breaches.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Affected versions of Django-allauth are vulnerable to CSRF and replay attacks in the SAML login flow. RelayStatewas used to keep track of whether or not the login flow was IdP or SP initiated. As RelayState is a separate field, not part of the SAMLResponse payload, it was not signed, causing the vulnerability.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Insufficient Session Expiration due to access and refresh tokens remaining valid after the associated user account is deactivated. In django-allauth’s IdP OpenID Connect implementation, allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/request_validator.py does not check instance.user.is_active in validate_bearer_token() and validate_refresh_token(), and allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/device_codes.py previously returned token state without revalidating the user’s active status.

In Django-allauth, a vulnerability allows attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the login page when configuring the Facebook provider to use the `js_sdk` method, potentially compromising user sessions or stealing sensitive information.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to improper validation of the SAML RelayState parameter when IdP-initiated SSO is enabled. In the SAML login flow, django-allauth accepts any URL supplied in RelayState and uses it as the post-authentication redirect target, allowing untrusted external destinations to be processed without restriction when IdP-initiated SSO is turned on, which is disabled by default.

Affected versions of allauth are vulnerable to account enumeration through timing attacks (CWE-203). This vulnerability allows attackers to determine the existence of user accounts by measuring response times during email/password authentication attempts. The issue resides in the AuthenticationBackend._authenticate_by_email method, which did not mitigate timing discrepancies. Exploitation can be performed remotely with high feasibility. Users should update to the latest version of allauth to apply the implemented timing attack mitigations.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Authorization Bypass due to the use of a mutable identifier (preferred_username) from third-party providers for authorization decisions. The authentication logic in django-allauth’s social account handling uses the preferred_username field from Okta and NetIQ OpenID Connect identity providers as the canonical user identifier, which may be changed by an attacker and is not stable enough to base authorization on; the code fails to validate that the identifier is immutable.

An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker who controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.

A vulnerability in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker who can control both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, bypassing Jinja's sandbox protections. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have the ability to manipulate both the template's filename and its contents. The risk depends on the application's specific use case. This issue affects applications that render untrusted templates where the attacker can determine the template filename, potentially leading to severe security breaches.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Affected versions of Django-allauth are vulnerable to CSRF and replay attacks in the SAML login flow. RelayStatewas used to keep track of whether or not the login flow was IdP or SP initiated. As RelayState is a separate field, not part of the SAMLResponse payload, it was not signed, causing the vulnerability.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Insufficient Session Expiration due to access and refresh tokens remaining valid after the associated user account is deactivated. In django-allauth’s IdP OpenID Connect implementation, allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/request_validator.py does not check instance.user.is_active in validate_bearer_token() and validate_refresh_token(), and allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/device_codes.py previously returned token state without revalidating the user’s active status.

In Django-allauth, a vulnerability allows attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the login page when configuring the Facebook provider to use the `js_sdk` method, potentially compromising user sessions or stealing sensitive information.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to improper validation of the SAML RelayState parameter when IdP-initiated SSO is enabled. In the SAML login flow, django-allauth accepts any URL supplied in RelayState and uses it as the post-authentication redirect target, allowing untrusted external destinations to be processed without restriction when IdP-initiated SSO is turned on, which is disabled by default.

Affected versions of allauth are vulnerable to account enumeration through timing attacks (CWE-203). This vulnerability allows attackers to determine the existence of user accounts by measuring response times during email/password authentication attempts. The issue resides in the AuthenticationBackend._authenticate_by_email method, which did not mitigate timing discrepancies. Exploitation can be performed remotely with high feasibility. Users should update to the latest version of allauth to apply the implemented timing attack mitigations.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Authorization Bypass due to the use of a mutable identifier (preferred_username) from third-party providers for authorization decisions. The authentication logic in django-allauth’s social account handling uses the preferred_username field from Okta and NetIQ OpenID Connect identity providers as the canonical user identifier, which may be changed by an attacker and is not stable enough to base authorization on; the code fails to validate that the identifier is immutable.

An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker who controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.

A vulnerability in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker who can control both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, bypassing Jinja's sandbox protections. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have the ability to manipulate both the template's filename and its contents. The risk depends on the application's specific use case. This issue affects applications that render untrusted templates where the attacker can determine the template filename, potentially leading to severe security breaches.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Affected versions of Django-allauth are vulnerable to CSRF and replay attacks in the SAML login flow. RelayStatewas used to keep track of whether or not the login flow was IdP or SP initiated. As RelayState is a separate field, not part of the SAMLResponse payload, it was not signed, causing the vulnerability.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Insufficient Session Expiration due to access and refresh tokens remaining valid after the associated user account is deactivated. In django-allauth’s IdP OpenID Connect implementation, allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/request_validator.py does not check instance.user.is_active in validate_bearer_token() and validate_refresh_token(), and allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/device_codes.py previously returned token state without revalidating the user’s active status.

In Django-allauth, a vulnerability allows attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the login page when configuring the Facebook provider to use the `js_sdk` method, potentially compromising user sessions or stealing sensitive information.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to improper validation of the SAML RelayState parameter when IdP-initiated SSO is enabled. In the SAML login flow, django-allauth accepts any URL supplied in RelayState and uses it as the post-authentication redirect target, allowing untrusted external destinations to be processed without restriction when IdP-initiated SSO is turned on, which is disabled by default.

Affected versions of allauth are vulnerable to account enumeration through timing attacks (CWE-203). This vulnerability allows attackers to determine the existence of user accounts by measuring response times during email/password authentication attempts. The issue resides in the AuthenticationBackend._authenticate_by_email method, which did not mitigate timing discrepancies. Exploitation can be performed remotely with high feasibility. Users should update to the latest version of allauth to apply the implemented timing attack mitigations.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Authorization Bypass due to the use of a mutable identifier (preferred_username) from third-party providers for authorization decisions. The authentication logic in django-allauth’s social account handling uses the preferred_username field from Okta and NetIQ OpenID Connect identity providers as the canonical user identifier, which may be changed by an attacker and is not stable enough to base authorization on; the code fails to validate that the identifier is immutable.

An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker who controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.

A vulnerability in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker who can control both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, bypassing Jinja's sandbox protections. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have the ability to manipulate both the template's filename and its contents. The risk depends on the application's specific use case. This issue affects applications that render untrusted templates where the attacker can determine the template filename, potentially leading to severe security breaches.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Affected versions of Django-allauth are vulnerable to CSRF and replay attacks in the SAML login flow. RelayStatewas used to keep track of whether or not the login flow was IdP or SP initiated. As RelayState is a separate field, not part of the SAMLResponse payload, it was not signed, causing the vulnerability.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Insufficient Session Expiration due to access and refresh tokens remaining valid after the associated user account is deactivated. In django-allauth’s IdP OpenID Connect implementation, allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/request_validator.py does not check instance.user.is_active in validate_bearer_token() and validate_refresh_token(), and allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/device_codes.py previously returned token state without revalidating the user’s active status.

In Django-allauth, a vulnerability allows attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the login page when configuring the Facebook provider to use the `js_sdk` method, potentially compromising user sessions or stealing sensitive information.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to improper validation of the SAML RelayState parameter when IdP-initiated SSO is enabled. In the SAML login flow, django-allauth accepts any URL supplied in RelayState and uses it as the post-authentication redirect target, allowing untrusted external destinations to be processed without restriction when IdP-initiated SSO is turned on, which is disabled by default.

Affected versions of allauth are vulnerable to account enumeration through timing attacks (CWE-203). This vulnerability allows attackers to determine the existence of user accounts by measuring response times during email/password authentication attempts. The issue resides in the AuthenticationBackend._authenticate_by_email method, which did not mitigate timing discrepancies. Exploitation can be performed remotely with high feasibility. Users should update to the latest version of allauth to apply the implemented timing attack mitigations.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Authorization Bypass due to the use of a mutable identifier (preferred_username) from third-party providers for authorization decisions. The authentication logic in django-allauth’s social account handling uses the preferred_username field from Okta and NetIQ OpenID Connect identity providers as the canonical user identifier, which may be changed by an attacker and is not stable enough to base authorization on; the code fails to validate that the identifier is immutable.

An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker who controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.

A vulnerability in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker who can control both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, bypassing Jinja's sandbox protections. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have the ability to manipulate both the template's filename and its contents. The risk depends on the application's specific use case. This issue affects applications that render untrusted templates where the attacker can determine the template filename, potentially leading to severe security breaches.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Affected versions of Django-allauth are vulnerable to CSRF and replay attacks in the SAML login flow. RelayStatewas used to keep track of whether or not the login flow was IdP or SP initiated. As RelayState is a separate field, not part of the SAMLResponse payload, it was not signed, causing the vulnerability.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Insufficient Session Expiration due to access and refresh tokens remaining valid after the associated user account is deactivated. In django-allauth’s IdP OpenID Connect implementation, allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/request_validator.py does not check instance.user.is_active in validate_bearer_token() and validate_refresh_token(), and allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/device_codes.py previously returned token state without revalidating the user’s active status.

In Django-allauth, a vulnerability allows attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the login page when configuring the Facebook provider to use the `js_sdk` method, potentially compromising user sessions or stealing sensitive information.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to improper validation of the SAML RelayState parameter when IdP-initiated SSO is enabled. In the SAML login flow, django-allauth accepts any URL supplied in RelayState and uses it as the post-authentication redirect target, allowing untrusted external destinations to be processed without restriction when IdP-initiated SSO is turned on, which is disabled by default.

Affected versions of allauth are vulnerable to account enumeration through timing attacks (CWE-203). This vulnerability allows attackers to determine the existence of user accounts by measuring response times during email/password authentication attempts. The issue resides in the AuthenticationBackend._authenticate_by_email method, which did not mitigate timing discrepancies. Exploitation can be performed remotely with high feasibility. Users should update to the latest version of allauth to apply the implemented timing attack mitigations.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Authorization Bypass due to the use of a mutable identifier (preferred_username) from third-party providers for authorization decisions. The authentication logic in django-allauth’s social account handling uses the preferred_username field from Okta and NetIQ OpenID Connect identity providers as the canonical user identifier, which may be changed by an attacker and is not stable enough to base authorization on; the code fails to validate that the identifier is immutable.

An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker who controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.

A vulnerability in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker who can control both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, bypassing Jinja's sandbox protections. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have the ability to manipulate both the template's filename and its contents. The risk depends on the application's specific use case. This issue affects applications that render untrusted templates where the attacker can determine the template filename, potentially leading to severe security breaches.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Affected versions of Django-allauth are vulnerable to CSRF and replay attacks in the SAML login flow. RelayStatewas used to keep track of whether or not the login flow was IdP or SP initiated. As RelayState is a separate field, not part of the SAMLResponse payload, it was not signed, causing the vulnerability.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Insufficient Session Expiration due to access and refresh tokens remaining valid after the associated user account is deactivated. In django-allauth’s IdP OpenID Connect implementation, allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/request_validator.py does not check instance.user.is_active in validate_bearer_token() and validate_refresh_token(), and allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/device_codes.py previously returned token state without revalidating the user’s active status.

In Django-allauth, a vulnerability allows attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the login page when configuring the Facebook provider to use the `js_sdk` method, potentially compromising user sessions or stealing sensitive information.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to improper validation of the SAML RelayState parameter when IdP-initiated SSO is enabled. In the SAML login flow, django-allauth accepts any URL supplied in RelayState and uses it as the post-authentication redirect target, allowing untrusted external destinations to be processed without restriction when IdP-initiated SSO is turned on, which is disabled by default.

Affected versions of allauth are vulnerable to account enumeration through timing attacks (CWE-203). This vulnerability allows attackers to determine the existence of user accounts by measuring response times during email/password authentication attempts. The issue resides in the AuthenticationBackend._authenticate_by_email method, which did not mitigate timing discrepancies. Exploitation can be performed remotely with high feasibility. Users should update to the latest version of allauth to apply the implemented timing attack mitigations.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Authorization Bypass due to the use of a mutable identifier (preferred_username) from third-party providers for authorization decisions. The authentication logic in django-allauth’s social account handling uses the preferred_username field from Okta and NetIQ OpenID Connect identity providers as the canonical user identifier, which may be changed by an attacker and is not stable enough to base authorization on; the code fails to validate that the identifier is immutable.

An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker who controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.

A vulnerability in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker who can control both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, bypassing Jinja's sandbox protections. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have the ability to manipulate both the template's filename and its contents. The risk depends on the application's specific use case. This issue affects applications that render untrusted templates where the attacker can determine the template filename, potentially leading to severe security breaches.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Affected versions of Django-allauth are vulnerable to CSRF and replay attacks in the SAML login flow. RelayStatewas used to keep track of whether or not the login flow was IdP or SP initiated. As RelayState is a separate field, not part of the SAMLResponse payload, it was not signed, causing the vulnerability.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Insufficient Session Expiration due to access and refresh tokens remaining valid after the associated user account is deactivated. In django-allauth’s IdP OpenID Connect implementation, allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/request_validator.py does not check instance.user.is_active in validate_bearer_token() and validate_refresh_token(), and allauth/idp/oidc/internal/oauthlib/device_codes.py previously returned token state without revalidating the user’s active status.

In Django-allauth, a vulnerability allows attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the login page when configuring the Facebook provider to use the `js_sdk` method, potentially compromising user sessions or stealing sensitive information.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to improper validation of the SAML RelayState parameter when IdP-initiated SSO is enabled. In the SAML login flow, django-allauth accepts any URL supplied in RelayState and uses it as the post-authentication redirect target, allowing untrusted external destinations to be processed without restriction when IdP-initiated SSO is turned on, which is disabled by default.

Affected versions of allauth are vulnerable to account enumeration through timing attacks (CWE-203). This vulnerability allows attackers to determine the existence of user accounts by measuring response times during email/password authentication attempts. The issue resides in the AuthenticationBackend._authenticate_by_email method, which did not mitigate timing discrepancies. Exploitation can be performed remotely with high feasibility. Users should update to the latest version of allauth to apply the implemented timing attack mitigations.

Affected versions of the django-allauth package are vulnerable to Authorization Bypass due to the use of a mutable identifier (preferred_username) from third-party providers for authorization decisions. The authentication logic in django-allauth’s social account handling uses the preferred_username field from Okta and NetIQ OpenID Connect identity providers as the canonical user identifier, which may be changed by an attacker and is not stable enough to base authorization on; the code fails to validate that the identifier is immutable.