Ecdsa does not protects against side-channel attacks. This is because Python does not provide side-channel secure primitives (with the exception of hmac.compare_digest()), making side-channel secure programming impossible. For a sophisticated attacker observing just one operation with a private key will be sufficient to completely reconstruct the private key.
https://pypi.org/project/ecdsa/#Security

The python-ecdsa library, which implements ECDSA cryptography in Python, is vulnerable to the Minerva attack (CVE-2024-23342). This vulnerability arises because scalar multiplication is not performed in constant time, affecting ECDSA signatures, key generation, and ECDH operations. ECDSA signature verification remains unaffected. The project maintainers have stated that there is no plan to release a fix for this vulnerability, citing their security policy:
"As stated in the security policy, side-channel vulnerabilities are outside the scope of the project. This is not due to a lack of interest in side-channel secure implementations but rather because the main goal of the project is to be pure Python. Implementing side-channel-free code in pure Python is impossible. Therefore, we do not plan to release a fix for this vulnerability."
NOTE: The specs we include in this advisory differ from the publicly available on other sources. That's because research by Safety CLI Cybersecurity Team confirms that there is no plan to address this vulnerability.

Ecdsa does not protects against side-channel attacks. This is because Python does not provide side-channel secure primitives (with the exception of hmac.compare_digest()), making side-channel secure programming impossible. For a sophisticated attacker observing just one operation with a private key will be sufficient to completely reconstruct the private key.
https://pypi.org/project/ecdsa/#Security

The python-ecdsa library, which implements ECDSA cryptography in Python, is vulnerable to the Minerva attack (CVE-2024-23342). This vulnerability arises because scalar multiplication is not performed in constant time, affecting ECDSA signatures, key generation, and ECDH operations. ECDSA signature verification remains unaffected. The project maintainers have stated that there is no plan to release a fix for this vulnerability, citing their security policy:
"As stated in the security policy, side-channel vulnerabilities are outside the scope of the project. This is not due to a lack of interest in side-channel secure implementations but rather because the main goal of the project is to be pure Python. Implementing side-channel-free code in pure Python is impossible. Therefore, we do not plan to release a fix for this vulnerability."
NOTE: The specs we include in this advisory differ from the publicly available on other sources. That's because research by Safety CLI Cybersecurity Team confirms that there is no plan to address this vulnerability.

Ecdsa does not protects against side-channel attacks. This is because Python does not provide side-channel secure primitives (with the exception of hmac.compare_digest()), making side-channel secure programming impossible. For a sophisticated attacker observing just one operation with a private key will be sufficient to completely reconstruct the private key.
https://pypi.org/project/ecdsa/#Security

The python-ecdsa library, which implements ECDSA cryptography in Python, is vulnerable to the Minerva attack (CVE-2024-23342). This vulnerability arises because scalar multiplication is not performed in constant time, affecting ECDSA signatures, key generation, and ECDH operations. ECDSA signature verification remains unaffected. The project maintainers have stated that there is no plan to release a fix for this vulnerability, citing their security policy:
"As stated in the security policy, side-channel vulnerabilities are outside the scope of the project. This is not due to a lack of interest in side-channel secure implementations but rather because the main goal of the project is to be pure Python. Implementing side-channel-free code in pure Python is impossible. Therefore, we do not plan to release a fix for this vulnerability."
NOTE: The specs we include in this advisory differ from the publicly available on other sources. That's because research by Safety CLI Cybersecurity Team confirms that there is no plan to address this vulnerability.

Ecdsa does not protects against side-channel attacks. This is because Python does not provide side-channel secure primitives (with the exception of hmac.compare_digest()), making side-channel secure programming impossible. For a sophisticated attacker observing just one operation with a private key will be sufficient to completely reconstruct the private key.
https://pypi.org/project/ecdsa/#Security

The python-ecdsa library, which implements ECDSA cryptography in Python, is vulnerable to the Minerva attack (CVE-2024-23342). This vulnerability arises because scalar multiplication is not performed in constant time, affecting ECDSA signatures, key generation, and ECDH operations. ECDSA signature verification remains unaffected. The project maintainers have stated that there is no plan to release a fix for this vulnerability, citing their security policy:
"As stated in the security policy, side-channel vulnerabilities are outside the scope of the project. This is not due to a lack of interest in side-channel secure implementations but rather because the main goal of the project is to be pure Python. Implementing side-channel-free code in pure Python is impossible. Therefore, we do not plan to release a fix for this vulnerability."
NOTE: The specs we include in this advisory differ from the publicly available on other sources. That's because research by Safety CLI Cybersecurity Team confirms that there is no plan to address this vulnerability.

Ecdsa does not protects against side-channel attacks. This is because Python does not provide side-channel secure primitives (with the exception of hmac.compare_digest()), making side-channel secure programming impossible. For a sophisticated attacker observing just one operation with a private key will be sufficient to completely reconstruct the private key.
https://pypi.org/project/ecdsa/#Security

The python-ecdsa library, which implements ECDSA cryptography in Python, is vulnerable to the Minerva attack (CVE-2024-23342). This vulnerability arises because scalar multiplication is not performed in constant time, affecting ECDSA signatures, key generation, and ECDH operations. ECDSA signature verification remains unaffected. The project maintainers have stated that there is no plan to release a fix for this vulnerability, citing their security policy:
"As stated in the security policy, side-channel vulnerabilities are outside the scope of the project. This is not due to a lack of interest in side-channel secure implementations but rather because the main goal of the project is to be pure Python. Implementing side-channel-free code in pure Python is impossible. Therefore, we do not plan to release a fix for this vulnerability."
NOTE: The specs we include in this advisory differ from the publicly available on other sources. That's because research by Safety CLI Cybersecurity Team confirms that there is no plan to address this vulnerability.

Ecdsa does not protects against side-channel attacks. This is because Python does not provide side-channel secure primitives (with the exception of hmac.compare_digest()), making side-channel secure programming impossible. For a sophisticated attacker observing just one operation with a private key will be sufficient to completely reconstruct the private key.
https://pypi.org/project/ecdsa/#Security

The python-ecdsa library, which implements ECDSA cryptography in Python, is vulnerable to the Minerva attack (CVE-2024-23342). This vulnerability arises because scalar multiplication is not performed in constant time, affecting ECDSA signatures, key generation, and ECDH operations. ECDSA signature verification remains unaffected. The project maintainers have stated that there is no plan to release a fix for this vulnerability, citing their security policy:
"As stated in the security policy, side-channel vulnerabilities are outside the scope of the project. This is not due to a lack of interest in side-channel secure implementations but rather because the main goal of the project is to be pure Python. Implementing side-channel-free code in pure Python is impossible. Therefore, we do not plan to release a fix for this vulnerability."
NOTE: The specs we include in this advisory differ from the publicly available on other sources. That's because research by Safety CLI Cybersecurity Team confirms that there is no plan to address this vulnerability.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Ecdsa does not protects against side-channel attacks. This is because Python does not provide side-channel secure primitives (with the exception of hmac.compare_digest()), making side-channel secure programming impossible. For a sophisticated attacker observing just one operation with a private key will be sufficient to completely reconstruct the private key.
https://pypi.org/project/ecdsa/#Security

The python-ecdsa library, which implements ECDSA cryptography in Python, is vulnerable to the Minerva attack (CVE-2024-23342). This vulnerability arises because scalar multiplication is not performed in constant time, affecting ECDSA signatures, key generation, and ECDH operations. ECDSA signature verification remains unaffected. The project maintainers have stated that there is no plan to release a fix for this vulnerability, citing their security policy:
"As stated in the security policy, side-channel vulnerabilities are outside the scope of the project. This is not due to a lack of interest in side-channel secure implementations but rather because the main goal of the project is to be pure Python. Implementing side-channel-free code in pure Python is impossible. Therefore, we do not plan to release a fix for this vulnerability."
NOTE: The specs we include in this advisory differ from the publicly available on other sources. That's because research by Safety CLI Cybersecurity Team confirms that there is no plan to address this vulnerability.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Ecdsa does not protects against side-channel attacks. This is because Python does not provide side-channel secure primitives (with the exception of hmac.compare_digest()), making side-channel secure programming impossible. For a sophisticated attacker observing just one operation with a private key will be sufficient to completely reconstruct the private key.
https://pypi.org/project/ecdsa/#Security

The python-ecdsa library, which implements ECDSA cryptography in Python, is vulnerable to the Minerva attack (CVE-2024-23342). This vulnerability arises because scalar multiplication is not performed in constant time, affecting ECDSA signatures, key generation, and ECDH operations. ECDSA signature verification remains unaffected. The project maintainers have stated that there is no plan to release a fix for this vulnerability, citing their security policy:
"As stated in the security policy, side-channel vulnerabilities are outside the scope of the project. This is not due to a lack of interest in side-channel secure implementations but rather because the main goal of the project is to be pure Python. Implementing side-channel-free code in pure Python is impossible. Therefore, we do not plan to release a fix for this vulnerability."
NOTE: The specs we include in this advisory differ from the publicly available on other sources. That's because research by Safety CLI Cybersecurity Team confirms that there is no plan to address this vulnerability.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Ecdsa does not protects against side-channel attacks. This is because Python does not provide side-channel secure primitives (with the exception of hmac.compare_digest()), making side-channel secure programming impossible. For a sophisticated attacker observing just one operation with a private key will be sufficient to completely reconstruct the private key.
https://pypi.org/project/ecdsa/#Security

The python-ecdsa library, which implements ECDSA cryptography in Python, is vulnerable to the Minerva attack (CVE-2024-23342). This vulnerability arises because scalar multiplication is not performed in constant time, affecting ECDSA signatures, key generation, and ECDH operations. ECDSA signature verification remains unaffected. The project maintainers have stated that there is no plan to release a fix for this vulnerability, citing their security policy:
"As stated in the security policy, side-channel vulnerabilities are outside the scope of the project. This is not due to a lack of interest in side-channel secure implementations but rather because the main goal of the project is to be pure Python. Implementing side-channel-free code in pure Python is impossible. Therefore, we do not plan to release a fix for this vulnerability."
NOTE: The specs we include in this advisory differ from the publicly available on other sources. That's because research by Safety CLI Cybersecurity Team confirms that there is no plan to address this vulnerability.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Ecdsa does not protects against side-channel attacks. This is because Python does not provide side-channel secure primitives (with the exception of hmac.compare_digest()), making side-channel secure programming impossible. For a sophisticated attacker observing just one operation with a private key will be sufficient to completely reconstruct the private key.
https://pypi.org/project/ecdsa/#Security

The python-ecdsa library, which implements ECDSA cryptography in Python, is vulnerable to the Minerva attack (CVE-2024-23342). This vulnerability arises because scalar multiplication is not performed in constant time, affecting ECDSA signatures, key generation, and ECDH operations. ECDSA signature verification remains unaffected. The project maintainers have stated that there is no plan to release a fix for this vulnerability, citing their security policy:
"As stated in the security policy, side-channel vulnerabilities are outside the scope of the project. This is not due to a lack of interest in side-channel secure implementations but rather because the main goal of the project is to be pure Python. Implementing side-channel-free code in pure Python is impossible. Therefore, we do not plan to release a fix for this vulnerability."
NOTE: The specs we include in this advisory differ from the publicly available on other sources. That's because research by Safety CLI Cybersecurity Team confirms that there is no plan to address this vulnerability.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Ecdsa does not protects against side-channel attacks. This is because Python does not provide side-channel secure primitives (with the exception of hmac.compare_digest()), making side-channel secure programming impossible. For a sophisticated attacker observing just one operation with a private key will be sufficient to completely reconstruct the private key.
https://pypi.org/project/ecdsa/#Security

The python-ecdsa library, which implements ECDSA cryptography in Python, is vulnerable to the Minerva attack (CVE-2024-23342). This vulnerability arises because scalar multiplication is not performed in constant time, affecting ECDSA signatures, key generation, and ECDH operations. ECDSA signature verification remains unaffected. The project maintainers have stated that there is no plan to release a fix for this vulnerability, citing their security policy:
"As stated in the security policy, side-channel vulnerabilities are outside the scope of the project. This is not due to a lack of interest in side-channel secure implementations but rather because the main goal of the project is to be pure Python. Implementing side-channel-free code in pure Python is impossible. Therefore, we do not plan to release a fix for this vulnerability."
NOTE: The specs we include in this advisory differ from the publicly available on other sources. That's because research by Safety CLI Cybersecurity Team confirms that there is no plan to address this vulnerability.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Ecdsa does not protects against side-channel attacks. This is because Python does not provide side-channel secure primitives (with the exception of hmac.compare_digest()), making side-channel secure programming impossible. For a sophisticated attacker observing just one operation with a private key will be sufficient to completely reconstruct the private key.
https://pypi.org/project/ecdsa/#Security

The python-ecdsa library, which implements ECDSA cryptography in Python, is vulnerable to the Minerva attack (CVE-2024-23342). This vulnerability arises because scalar multiplication is not performed in constant time, affecting ECDSA signatures, key generation, and ECDH operations. ECDSA signature verification remains unaffected. The project maintainers have stated that there is no plan to release a fix for this vulnerability, citing their security policy:
"As stated in the security policy, side-channel vulnerabilities are outside the scope of the project. This is not due to a lack of interest in side-channel secure implementations but rather because the main goal of the project is to be pure Python. Implementing side-channel-free code in pure Python is impossible. Therefore, we do not plan to release a fix for this vulnerability."
NOTE: The specs we include in this advisory differ from the publicly available on other sources. That's because research by Safety CLI Cybersecurity Team confirms that there is no plan to address this vulnerability.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Ecdsa does not protects against side-channel attacks. This is because Python does not provide side-channel secure primitives (with the exception of hmac.compare_digest()), making side-channel secure programming impossible. For a sophisticated attacker observing just one operation with a private key will be sufficient to completely reconstruct the private key.
https://pypi.org/project/ecdsa/#Security

The python-ecdsa library, which implements ECDSA cryptography in Python, is vulnerable to the Minerva attack (CVE-2024-23342). This vulnerability arises because scalar multiplication is not performed in constant time, affecting ECDSA signatures, key generation, and ECDH operations. ECDSA signature verification remains unaffected. The project maintainers have stated that there is no plan to release a fix for this vulnerability, citing their security policy:
"As stated in the security policy, side-channel vulnerabilities are outside the scope of the project. This is not due to a lack of interest in side-channel secure implementations but rather because the main goal of the project is to be pure Python. Implementing side-channel-free code in pure Python is impossible. Therefore, we do not plan to release a fix for this vulnerability."
NOTE: The specs we include in this advisory differ from the publicly available on other sources. That's because research by Safety CLI Cybersecurity Team confirms that there is no plan to address this vulnerability.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Ecdsa does not protects against side-channel attacks. This is because Python does not provide side-channel secure primitives (with the exception of hmac.compare_digest()), making side-channel secure programming impossible. For a sophisticated attacker observing just one operation with a private key will be sufficient to completely reconstruct the private key.
https://pypi.org/project/ecdsa/#Security

The python-ecdsa library, which implements ECDSA cryptography in Python, is vulnerable to the Minerva attack (CVE-2024-23342). This vulnerability arises because scalar multiplication is not performed in constant time, affecting ECDSA signatures, key generation, and ECDH operations. ECDSA signature verification remains unaffected. The project maintainers have stated that there is no plan to release a fix for this vulnerability, citing their security policy:
"As stated in the security policy, side-channel vulnerabilities are outside the scope of the project. This is not due to a lack of interest in side-channel secure implementations but rather because the main goal of the project is to be pure Python. Implementing side-channel-free code in pure Python is impossible. Therefore, we do not plan to release a fix for this vulnerability."
NOTE: The specs we include in this advisory differ from the publicly available on other sources. That's because research by Safety CLI Cybersecurity Team confirms that there is no plan to address this vulnerability.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.

Ecdsa does not protects against side-channel attacks. This is because Python does not provide side-channel secure primitives (with the exception of hmac.compare_digest()), making side-channel secure programming impossible. For a sophisticated attacker observing just one operation with a private key will be sufficient to completely reconstruct the private key.
https://pypi.org/project/ecdsa/#Security

The python-ecdsa library, which implements ECDSA cryptography in Python, is vulnerable to the Minerva attack (CVE-2024-23342). This vulnerability arises because scalar multiplication is not performed in constant time, affecting ECDSA signatures, key generation, and ECDH operations. ECDSA signature verification remains unaffected. The project maintainers have stated that there is no plan to release a fix for this vulnerability, citing their security policy:
"As stated in the security policy, side-channel vulnerabilities are outside the scope of the project. This is not due to a lack of interest in side-channel secure implementations but rather because the main goal of the project is to be pure Python. Implementing side-channel-free code in pure Python is impossible. Therefore, we do not plan to release a fix for this vulnerability."
NOTE: The specs we include in this advisory differ from the publicly available on other sources. That's because research by Safety CLI Cybersecurity Team confirms that there is no plan to address this vulnerability.

Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.