Urllib3's ProxyManager ensures that the Proxy-Authorization header is correctly directed only to configured proxies. However, when HTTP requests bypass urllib3's proxy support, there's a risk of inadvertently setting the Proxy-Authorization header, which remains ineffective without a forwarding or tunneling proxy. Urllib3 does not recognize this header as carrying authentication data, failing to remove it during cross-origin redirects. While this scenario is uncommon and poses low risk to most users, urllib3 now proactively removes the Proxy-Authorization header during cross-origin redirects as a precautionary measure. Users are advised to utilize urllib3's proxy support or disable automatic redirects to handle the Proxy-Authorization header securely. Despite these precautions, urllib3 defaults to stripping the header to safeguard users who may inadvertently misconfigure requests.

Affected versions of the urllib3 package are vulnerable to Information Disclosure due to improper handling of sensitive headers during cross-origin redirects in the low-level proxy API. When following cross-origin redirects via ProxyManager.connection_from_url().urlopen() with assert_same_host=False, sensitive headers including Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization are not stripped, unlike the high-level API, which removes them via Retry.DEFAULT_REMOVE_HEADERS_ON_REDIRECT. An attacker controlling a redirect target can capture these sensitive headers from requests that follow cross-origin redirects through the low-level proxy API path.

urllib3 is a user-friendly HTTP client library for Python. Prior to 2.5.0, it is possible to disable redirects for all requests by instantiating a PoolManager and specifying retries in a way that disable redirects. By default, requests and botocore users are not affected. An application attempting to mitigate SSRF or open redirect vulnerabilities by disabling redirects at the PoolManager level will remain vulnerable. This issue has been patched in version 2.5.0.

Affected versions of urllib3 are vulnerable to an HTTP redirect handling vulnerability that fails to remove the HTTP request body when a POST changes to a GET via 301, 302, or 303 responses. This flaw can expose sensitive request data if the origin service is compromised and redirects to a malicious endpoint, though exploitability is low when no sensitive data is used. The vulnerability affects automatic redirect behavior. It is fixed in versions 1.26.18 and 2.0.7; update or disable redirects using redirects=False.
This vulnerability is specific to Python's urllib3 library.

Urllib3 1.26.17 and 2.0.5 include a fix for CVE-2023-43804: Urllib3 doesn't treat the 'Cookie' HTTP header special or provide any helpers for managing cookies over HTTP, that is the responsibility of the user. However, it is possible for a user to specify a 'Cookie' header and unknowingly leak information via HTTP redirects to a different origin if that user doesn't disable redirects explicitly.
https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/security/advisories/GHSA-v845-jxx5-vc9f

Affected versions of the urllib3 package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to improper handling of highly compressed HTTP response bodies during streaming decompression. The urllib3.HTTPResponse methods stream(), read(), read1(), read_chunked(), and readinto() may fully decompress a minimal but highly compressed payload based on the Content-Encoding header into an internal buffer instead of limiting the decompressed output to the requested chunk size, causing excessive CPU usage and massive memory allocation on the client side.

Affected versions of the urllib3 package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to redirect handling that drains connections by decompressing redirect response bodies without enforcing streaming read limits. The issue occurs when using urllib3’s streaming mode (for example, preload_content=False) while allowing redirects, because urllib3.response.HTTPResponse.drain_conn() would call HTTPResponse.read() in a way that decoded/decompressed the entire redirect response body even before any streaming reads were performed, effectively bypassing decompression-bomb safeguards.

Urllib3 1.26.5 includes a fix for CVE-2021-33503: When provided with a URL containing many @ characters in the authority component, the authority regular expression exhibits catastrophic backtracking, causing a denial of service if a URL were passed as a parameter or redirected to via an HTTP redirect.
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q2q7-5pp4-w6pg

Affected versions of the urllib3 package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to allowing an unbounded number of content-encoding decompression steps for HTTP responses. The HTTPResponse content decoding pipeline in urllib3 follows the Content-Encoding header and applies each advertised compression algorithm in sequence without enforcing a maximum chain length or effective output size, so a malicious peer can send a response with a very long encoding chain that triggers excessive CPU use and massive memory allocation during decompression.

Urllib3 1.26.4 includes a fix for CVE-2021-28363: The urllib3 library 1.26.x before 1.26.4 for Python omits SSL certificate validation in some cases involving HTTPS to HTTPS proxies. The initial connection to the HTTPS proxy (if an SSLContext isn't given via proxy_config) doesn't verify the hostname of the certificate. This means certificates for different servers that still validate properly with the default urllib3 SSLContext will be silently accepted.

Urllib3's ProxyManager ensures that the Proxy-Authorization header is correctly directed only to configured proxies. However, when HTTP requests bypass urllib3's proxy support, there's a risk of inadvertently setting the Proxy-Authorization header, which remains ineffective without a forwarding or tunneling proxy. Urllib3 does not recognize this header as carrying authentication data, failing to remove it during cross-origin redirects. While this scenario is uncommon and poses low risk to most users, urllib3 now proactively removes the Proxy-Authorization header during cross-origin redirects as a precautionary measure. Users are advised to utilize urllib3's proxy support or disable automatic redirects to handle the Proxy-Authorization header securely. Despite these precautions, urllib3 defaults to stripping the header to safeguard users who may inadvertently misconfigure requests.

Affected versions of the urllib3 package are vulnerable to Information Disclosure due to improper handling of sensitive headers during cross-origin redirects in the low-level proxy API. When following cross-origin redirects via ProxyManager.connection_from_url().urlopen() with assert_same_host=False, sensitive headers including Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization are not stripped, unlike the high-level API, which removes them via Retry.DEFAULT_REMOVE_HEADERS_ON_REDIRECT. An attacker controlling a redirect target can capture these sensitive headers from requests that follow cross-origin redirects through the low-level proxy API path.

urllib3 is a user-friendly HTTP client library for Python. Prior to 2.5.0, it is possible to disable redirects for all requests by instantiating a PoolManager and specifying retries in a way that disable redirects. By default, requests and botocore users are not affected. An application attempting to mitigate SSRF or open redirect vulnerabilities by disabling redirects at the PoolManager level will remain vulnerable. This issue has been patched in version 2.5.0.

Affected versions of urllib3 are vulnerable to an HTTP redirect handling vulnerability that fails to remove the HTTP request body when a POST changes to a GET via 301, 302, or 303 responses. This flaw can expose sensitive request data if the origin service is compromised and redirects to a malicious endpoint, though exploitability is low when no sensitive data is used. The vulnerability affects automatic redirect behavior. It is fixed in versions 1.26.18 and 2.0.7; update or disable redirects using redirects=False.
This vulnerability is specific to Python's urllib3 library.

Urllib3 1.26.17 and 2.0.5 include a fix for CVE-2023-43804: Urllib3 doesn't treat the 'Cookie' HTTP header special or provide any helpers for managing cookies over HTTP, that is the responsibility of the user. However, it is possible for a user to specify a 'Cookie' header and unknowingly leak information via HTTP redirects to a different origin if that user doesn't disable redirects explicitly.
https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/security/advisories/GHSA-v845-jxx5-vc9f

Affected versions of the urllib3 package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to improper handling of highly compressed HTTP response bodies during streaming decompression. The urllib3.HTTPResponse methods stream(), read(), read1(), read_chunked(), and readinto() may fully decompress a minimal but highly compressed payload based on the Content-Encoding header into an internal buffer instead of limiting the decompressed output to the requested chunk size, causing excessive CPU usage and massive memory allocation on the client side.

Affected versions of the urllib3 package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to redirect handling that drains connections by decompressing redirect response bodies without enforcing streaming read limits. The issue occurs when using urllib3’s streaming mode (for example, preload_content=False) while allowing redirects, because urllib3.response.HTTPResponse.drain_conn() would call HTTPResponse.read() in a way that decoded/decompressed the entire redirect response body even before any streaming reads were performed, effectively bypassing decompression-bomb safeguards.

Urllib3 1.26.5 includes a fix for CVE-2021-33503: When provided with a URL containing many @ characters in the authority component, the authority regular expression exhibits catastrophic backtracking, causing a denial of service if a URL were passed as a parameter or redirected to via an HTTP redirect.
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q2q7-5pp4-w6pg

Affected versions of the urllib3 package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to allowing an unbounded number of content-encoding decompression steps for HTTP responses. The HTTPResponse content decoding pipeline in urllib3 follows the Content-Encoding header and applies each advertised compression algorithm in sequence without enforcing a maximum chain length or effective output size, so a malicious peer can send a response with a very long encoding chain that triggers excessive CPU use and massive memory allocation during decompression.

Urllib3 1.26.4 includes a fix for CVE-2021-28363: The urllib3 library 1.26.x before 1.26.4 for Python omits SSL certificate validation in some cases involving HTTPS to HTTPS proxies. The initial connection to the HTTPS proxy (if an SSLContext isn't given via proxy_config) doesn't verify the hostname of the certificate. This means certificates for different servers that still validate properly with the default urllib3 SSLContext will be silently accepted.

Urllib3's ProxyManager ensures that the Proxy-Authorization header is correctly directed only to configured proxies. However, when HTTP requests bypass urllib3's proxy support, there's a risk of inadvertently setting the Proxy-Authorization header, which remains ineffective without a forwarding or tunneling proxy. Urllib3 does not recognize this header as carrying authentication data, failing to remove it during cross-origin redirects. While this scenario is uncommon and poses low risk to most users, urllib3 now proactively removes the Proxy-Authorization header during cross-origin redirects as a precautionary measure. Users are advised to utilize urllib3's proxy support or disable automatic redirects to handle the Proxy-Authorization header securely. Despite these precautions, urllib3 defaults to stripping the header to safeguard users who may inadvertently misconfigure requests.

Affected versions of the urllib3 package are vulnerable to Information Disclosure due to improper handling of sensitive headers during cross-origin redirects in the low-level proxy API. When following cross-origin redirects via ProxyManager.connection_from_url().urlopen() with assert_same_host=False, sensitive headers including Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization are not stripped, unlike the high-level API, which removes them via Retry.DEFAULT_REMOVE_HEADERS_ON_REDIRECT. An attacker controlling a redirect target can capture these sensitive headers from requests that follow cross-origin redirects through the low-level proxy API path.

urllib3 is a user-friendly HTTP client library for Python. Prior to 2.5.0, it is possible to disable redirects for all requests by instantiating a PoolManager and specifying retries in a way that disable redirects. By default, requests and botocore users are not affected. An application attempting to mitigate SSRF or open redirect vulnerabilities by disabling redirects at the PoolManager level will remain vulnerable. This issue has been patched in version 2.5.0.

Affected versions of urllib3 are vulnerable to an HTTP redirect handling vulnerability that fails to remove the HTTP request body when a POST changes to a GET via 301, 302, or 303 responses. This flaw can expose sensitive request data if the origin service is compromised and redirects to a malicious endpoint, though exploitability is low when no sensitive data is used. The vulnerability affects automatic redirect behavior. It is fixed in versions 1.26.18 and 2.0.7; update or disable redirects using redirects=False.
This vulnerability is specific to Python's urllib3 library.

Urllib3 1.26.17 and 2.0.5 include a fix for CVE-2023-43804: Urllib3 doesn't treat the 'Cookie' HTTP header special or provide any helpers for managing cookies over HTTP, that is the responsibility of the user. However, it is possible for a user to specify a 'Cookie' header and unknowingly leak information via HTTP redirects to a different origin if that user doesn't disable redirects explicitly.
https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/security/advisories/GHSA-v845-jxx5-vc9f

Affected versions of the urllib3 package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to improper handling of highly compressed HTTP response bodies during streaming decompression. The urllib3.HTTPResponse methods stream(), read(), read1(), read_chunked(), and readinto() may fully decompress a minimal but highly compressed payload based on the Content-Encoding header into an internal buffer instead of limiting the decompressed output to the requested chunk size, causing excessive CPU usage and massive memory allocation on the client side.

Affected versions of the urllib3 package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to redirect handling that drains connections by decompressing redirect response bodies without enforcing streaming read limits. The issue occurs when using urllib3’s streaming mode (for example, preload_content=False) while allowing redirects, because urllib3.response.HTTPResponse.drain_conn() would call HTTPResponse.read() in a way that decoded/decompressed the entire redirect response body even before any streaming reads were performed, effectively bypassing decompression-bomb safeguards.

Urllib3 1.26.5 includes a fix for CVE-2021-33503: When provided with a URL containing many @ characters in the authority component, the authority regular expression exhibits catastrophic backtracking, causing a denial of service if a URL were passed as a parameter or redirected to via an HTTP redirect.
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q2q7-5pp4-w6pg

Affected versions of the urllib3 package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to allowing an unbounded number of content-encoding decompression steps for HTTP responses. The HTTPResponse content decoding pipeline in urllib3 follows the Content-Encoding header and applies each advertised compression algorithm in sequence without enforcing a maximum chain length or effective output size, so a malicious peer can send a response with a very long encoding chain that triggers excessive CPU use and massive memory allocation during decompression.

Urllib3 1.26.4 includes a fix for CVE-2021-28363: The urllib3 library 1.26.x before 1.26.4 for Python omits SSL certificate validation in some cases involving HTTPS to HTTPS proxies. The initial connection to the HTTPS proxy (if an SSLContext isn't given via proxy_config) doesn't verify the hostname of the certificate. This means certificates for different servers that still validate properly with the default urllib3 SSLContext will be silently accepted.

Urllib3's ProxyManager ensures that the Proxy-Authorization header is correctly directed only to configured proxies. However, when HTTP requests bypass urllib3's proxy support, there's a risk of inadvertently setting the Proxy-Authorization header, which remains ineffective without a forwarding or tunneling proxy. Urllib3 does not recognize this header as carrying authentication data, failing to remove it during cross-origin redirects. While this scenario is uncommon and poses low risk to most users, urllib3 now proactively removes the Proxy-Authorization header during cross-origin redirects as a precautionary measure. Users are advised to utilize urllib3's proxy support or disable automatic redirects to handle the Proxy-Authorization header securely. Despite these precautions, urllib3 defaults to stripping the header to safeguard users who may inadvertently misconfigure requests.

Affected versions of the urllib3 package are vulnerable to Information Disclosure due to improper handling of sensitive headers during cross-origin redirects in the low-level proxy API. When following cross-origin redirects via ProxyManager.connection_from_url().urlopen() with assert_same_host=False, sensitive headers including Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization are not stripped, unlike the high-level API, which removes them via Retry.DEFAULT_REMOVE_HEADERS_ON_REDIRECT. An attacker controlling a redirect target can capture these sensitive headers from requests that follow cross-origin redirects through the low-level proxy API path.

urllib3 is a user-friendly HTTP client library for Python. Prior to 2.5.0, it is possible to disable redirects for all requests by instantiating a PoolManager and specifying retries in a way that disable redirects. By default, requests and botocore users are not affected. An application attempting to mitigate SSRF or open redirect vulnerabilities by disabling redirects at the PoolManager level will remain vulnerable. This issue has been patched in version 2.5.0.

Affected versions of urllib3 are vulnerable to an HTTP redirect handling vulnerability that fails to remove the HTTP request body when a POST changes to a GET via 301, 302, or 303 responses. This flaw can expose sensitive request data if the origin service is compromised and redirects to a malicious endpoint, though exploitability is low when no sensitive data is used. The vulnerability affects automatic redirect behavior. It is fixed in versions 1.26.18 and 2.0.7; update or disable redirects using redirects=False.
This vulnerability is specific to Python's urllib3 library.

Urllib3 1.26.17 and 2.0.5 include a fix for CVE-2023-43804: Urllib3 doesn't treat the 'Cookie' HTTP header special or provide any helpers for managing cookies over HTTP, that is the responsibility of the user. However, it is possible for a user to specify a 'Cookie' header and unknowingly leak information via HTTP redirects to a different origin if that user doesn't disable redirects explicitly.
https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/security/advisories/GHSA-v845-jxx5-vc9f

Affected versions of the urllib3 package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to improper handling of highly compressed HTTP response bodies during streaming decompression. The urllib3.HTTPResponse methods stream(), read(), read1(), read_chunked(), and readinto() may fully decompress a minimal but highly compressed payload based on the Content-Encoding header into an internal buffer instead of limiting the decompressed output to the requested chunk size, causing excessive CPU usage and massive memory allocation on the client side.

Affected versions of the urllib3 package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to redirect handling that drains connections by decompressing redirect response bodies without enforcing streaming read limits. The issue occurs when using urllib3’s streaming mode (for example, preload_content=False) while allowing redirects, because urllib3.response.HTTPResponse.drain_conn() would call HTTPResponse.read() in a way that decoded/decompressed the entire redirect response body even before any streaming reads were performed, effectively bypassing decompression-bomb safeguards.

Urllib3 1.26.5 includes a fix for CVE-2021-33503: When provided with a URL containing many @ characters in the authority component, the authority regular expression exhibits catastrophic backtracking, causing a denial of service if a URL were passed as a parameter or redirected to via an HTTP redirect.
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q2q7-5pp4-w6pg

Affected versions of the urllib3 package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to allowing an unbounded number of content-encoding decompression steps for HTTP responses. The HTTPResponse content decoding pipeline in urllib3 follows the Content-Encoding header and applies each advertised compression algorithm in sequence without enforcing a maximum chain length or effective output size, so a malicious peer can send a response with a very long encoding chain that triggers excessive CPU use and massive memory allocation during decompression.

Urllib3 1.26.4 includes a fix for CVE-2021-28363: The urllib3 library 1.26.x before 1.26.4 for Python omits SSL certificate validation in some cases involving HTTPS to HTTPS proxies. The initial connection to the HTTPS proxy (if an SSLContext isn't given via proxy_config) doesn't verify the hostname of the certificate. This means certificates for different servers that still validate properly with the default urllib3 SSLContext will be silently accepted.

Urllib3's ProxyManager ensures that the Proxy-Authorization header is correctly directed only to configured proxies. However, when HTTP requests bypass urllib3's proxy support, there's a risk of inadvertently setting the Proxy-Authorization header, which remains ineffective without a forwarding or tunneling proxy. Urllib3 does not recognize this header as carrying authentication data, failing to remove it during cross-origin redirects. While this scenario is uncommon and poses low risk to most users, urllib3 now proactively removes the Proxy-Authorization header during cross-origin redirects as a precautionary measure. Users are advised to utilize urllib3's proxy support or disable automatic redirects to handle the Proxy-Authorization header securely. Despite these precautions, urllib3 defaults to stripping the header to safeguard users who may inadvertently misconfigure requests.

Affected versions of the urllib3 package are vulnerable to Information Disclosure due to improper handling of sensitive headers during cross-origin redirects in the low-level proxy API. When following cross-origin redirects via ProxyManager.connection_from_url().urlopen() with assert_same_host=False, sensitive headers including Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization are not stripped, unlike the high-level API, which removes them via Retry.DEFAULT_REMOVE_HEADERS_ON_REDIRECT. An attacker controlling a redirect target can capture these sensitive headers from requests that follow cross-origin redirects through the low-level proxy API path.

urllib3 is a user-friendly HTTP client library for Python. Prior to 2.5.0, it is possible to disable redirects for all requests by instantiating a PoolManager and specifying retries in a way that disable redirects. By default, requests and botocore users are not affected. An application attempting to mitigate SSRF or open redirect vulnerabilities by disabling redirects at the PoolManager level will remain vulnerable. This issue has been patched in version 2.5.0.

Affected versions of urllib3 are vulnerable to an HTTP redirect handling vulnerability that fails to remove the HTTP request body when a POST changes to a GET via 301, 302, or 303 responses. This flaw can expose sensitive request data if the origin service is compromised and redirects to a malicious endpoint, though exploitability is low when no sensitive data is used. The vulnerability affects automatic redirect behavior. It is fixed in versions 1.26.18 and 2.0.7; update or disable redirects using redirects=False.
This vulnerability is specific to Python's urllib3 library.

Urllib3 1.26.17 and 2.0.5 include a fix for CVE-2023-43804: Urllib3 doesn't treat the 'Cookie' HTTP header special or provide any helpers for managing cookies over HTTP, that is the responsibility of the user. However, it is possible for a user to specify a 'Cookie' header and unknowingly leak information via HTTP redirects to a different origin if that user doesn't disable redirects explicitly.
https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/security/advisories/GHSA-v845-jxx5-vc9f

Affected versions of the urllib3 package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to improper handling of highly compressed HTTP response bodies during streaming decompression. The urllib3.HTTPResponse methods stream(), read(), read1(), read_chunked(), and readinto() may fully decompress a minimal but highly compressed payload based on the Content-Encoding header into an internal buffer instead of limiting the decompressed output to the requested chunk size, causing excessive CPU usage and massive memory allocation on the client side.

Affected versions of the urllib3 package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to redirect handling that drains connections by decompressing redirect response bodies without enforcing streaming read limits. The issue occurs when using urllib3’s streaming mode (for example, preload_content=False) while allowing redirects, because urllib3.response.HTTPResponse.drain_conn() would call HTTPResponse.read() in a way that decoded/decompressed the entire redirect response body even before any streaming reads were performed, effectively bypassing decompression-bomb safeguards.

Urllib3 1.26.5 includes a fix for CVE-2021-33503: When provided with a URL containing many @ characters in the authority component, the authority regular expression exhibits catastrophic backtracking, causing a denial of service if a URL were passed as a parameter or redirected to via an HTTP redirect.
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q2q7-5pp4-w6pg

Affected versions of the urllib3 package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to allowing an unbounded number of content-encoding decompression steps for HTTP responses. The HTTPResponse content decoding pipeline in urllib3 follows the Content-Encoding header and applies each advertised compression algorithm in sequence without enforcing a maximum chain length or effective output size, so a malicious peer can send a response with a very long encoding chain that triggers excessive CPU use and massive memory allocation during decompression.

Urllib3 1.26.4 includes a fix for CVE-2021-28363: The urllib3 library 1.26.x before 1.26.4 for Python omits SSL certificate validation in some cases involving HTTPS to HTTPS proxies. The initial connection to the HTTPS proxy (if an SSLContext isn't given via proxy_config) doesn't verify the hostname of the certificate. This means certificates for different servers that still validate properly with the default urllib3 SSLContext will be silently accepted.